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I. INTRODUCTION
From a transactional perspective, cases decided during the Survey pe-
riod are consistent with the economic slowdown in real estate. For in-
* B.B.A., M.B.A., J.D., LL.M., Southern Methodist University; Attorney at Law,
Winstead PC, Dallas, Texas.
** B.S., Texas A&M, J.D., Southern Methodist University, Attorney at Law, Win-
stead PC, Dallas, Texas.
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stance, there were a significant number of cases dealing with breach of
contracts (each alleging the typical causes of action: common law and
statutory fraud, negligence, misrepresentation, and Deceptive Trade
Practices Act violations) and the like. Continuing the trend seen over the
last few Survey periods, numerous cases dealt with tax liens, the transfer
thereof, and foreclosure on transferred ad valorem tax liens. We have
limited the Article's scope to a few of the more meaningful cases on this
topic. We have also highlighted two cases dealing with specific-perform-
ance causes of action and included a significant Texas Supreme Court
opinion relating to validity of a jury-waiver clause.
There were no substantive changes in real property law in the areas of
debtor/creditor relationships, guaranties, usury, leases and landlord/ten-
ant relationships, or in the more traditional areas relating to conveyances,
other title matters, and related miscellaneous property rights.
II. MORTGAGES, LIENS, AND FORECLOSURES
Morrison v. Christie' presents a deed-in-lieu-of-foreclosure transaction.
Morrison borrowed $200,000 from Christie, signing a note and deed of
trust. Seven months later, the Morrisons executed a deed in lieu of fore-
closure conveying the property to Christie. The conveyance deed recited
as consideration the application by Christie of net proceeds from the
property sale to the unpaid balance on the note, with Morrison being
liable for any deficiency after the sale. When Christie sold the property
four months later, a $50,000 deficiency remained. Christie sued for the
deficiency, and Morrison alleged that Christie failed to undertake a non-
judicial foreclosure and therefore did not comply with the requirements
for bringing the deficiency suit. On appeal, the Fort Worth Court of Ap-
peals addressed whether evidence was sufficient to show the parties in-
tended a mortgage rather than an absolute conveyance. The court of
appeals held that the deed unambiguously conveyed the property in ex-
change for forbearance of the foreclosure and the application of net pro-
ceeds from the sale to the outstanding debt; therefore, Morrison had to
provide evidence demonstrating a different intent of the parties. 2 Chris-
tie's motion for summary judgment provided details and evidence suffi-
cient to establish his claim, including copies of the executed documents, a
default letter, notice of foreclosure, and an affidavit of Christie's attorney
summarizing the telephone conversation giving rise to the transaction.
On the other hand, Morrison provided only conclusory statements of his
intent not to remain liable for the deficiency. The court of appeals held
that such evidence was insufficient to establish a genuine issue of fact.3
Morrison also argued the conveyance lacked consideration, but the
court of appeals dismissed that argument, noting that Morrison received
consideration by avoiding the negative credit effect that a foreclosure
1. 266 S.W.3d 89 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2008, no pet.).
2. Id. at 93.
3. Id. at 94.
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would cause, through Christie's agreement to postpone a foreclosure sale,
and by the application of net proceeds against the outstanding debt. That
Christie retained the right to later foreclose on the deed of trust was not a
fact that would prevent the transaction from becoming an absolute con-
veyance in payment of the debt.4 The court of appeals also dismissed
Morrison's claim that a deficiency action could be initiated only after a
foreclosure under a security agreement. This deficiency action was
brought under the note, and not the deed-in-lieu of conveyance, with the
court of appeals concluding that, while deed-in-lieu transactions are typi-
cally given in full satisfaction of a debt, the parties can agree to a deed-in-
lieu transaction in partial satisfaction of a debt.5 The court of appeals
dismissed Morrison's claim that the deed in lieu was a mortgage. Even
though it contained Christie's right to sell the property, the court of ap-
peals held that such language was not the equivalent of a power-of-sale
clause typically found in most deeds of trust.6 Therefore, the court of
appeals concluded that the deed in lieu was not intended as a mortgage or
deed of trust.7 Finally, the Morrisons argued that the full, fair-market
value of the property should be a credit against the debt, as contemplated
under section 51.003 of the Texas Property Code.8 The court of appeals
held that this section applied only to foreclosures and had no relevance to
deed-in-lieu transactions. 9 Practitioners will find comfort in this case, be-
cause it supports common prevailing practices in deed-in-lieu
transactions.
An abstract of judgment was invalidated in Gary E. Patterson & Asso-
ciates v. Holub.10 Thomas owed the Patterson law firm $47,000, but the
firm agreed in a settlement to accept $22,500. Thomas paid an initial $500
at the time of settlement. Patterson subsequently obtained an abstract of
judgment for $22,500 and filed it in the county records. Holub, a subse-
quent purchaser of the property, claimed that the abstract of judgment
was invalid because it did not comply with the applicable statute." Upon
review, the Houston First Court of Appeals held that the abstract of judg-
ment must be in "the amount for which the judgment was rendered and
the balance due."12 Since the judgment lien is created by statute, the
court of appeals required substantial compliance with the statutory re-
quirements as a condition to the attachment of the creditor's lien. Al-
though there are some cases that allow minor deficiencies, the court of
appeals concluded that the $500 difference in the amount due prevented
the abstract of judgment from substantially complying with the statutory
4. Id.
5. Id. at 95.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.003 (Vernon 2007).
9. Morrison, 266 S.W.3d at 96.
10. 264 S.W.3d 180 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. denied).
11. See TEX. PROP. CODE Am. § 13.002 (Vernon 2004).
12. Patterson, 264 S.W.3d at 193 (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN., § 52.003(a)(6)
(Vernon 1995)).
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requirements.' 3 Thus, the court of appeals held that it did not constitute
a lien against the property. 14 While this holding appears harsh in some
respects, it demonstrates the need to comply strictly with the statute.
Kothmann v. Genesis Tax Loan Services, Inc.1s explains how tax liens,
which are otherwise valid and superior to a deed of trust, can lose their
priority. The case demonstrates the critical importance of proper plead-
ing. Ad valorem taxes were not paid for 2003 on certain properties in
Lubbock; Genesis paid the taxes, obtained a transfer of lien, and filed a
deed of trust to secure repayment, pursuant to the Texas Tax Code.16 At
the time of recording of the tax lien deeds of trust, the properties were
subject to existing deed-of-trust liens. As the holder of deeds of trust,
Kothmann held a foreclosure sale which predated the execution and filing
of Genesis's deeds of trust. When Genesis later sought foreclosure of its
tax-lien deeds of trust, Kothmann brought suit alleging that the Genesis
deeds of trust were inferior to those held by Kothmann. Genesis re-
sponded with a general denial.' 7 Notwithstanding any statutory priority
given to tax-lien deeds of trust,' 8 Kothmann alleged that Genesis's failure
to assert its tax-lien status as an affirmative defense under Rule 94 of the
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure' 9 constituted a fatal error.
The Amarillo Court of Appeals addressed whether the assertion of a
tax lien was an affirmative defense which must be specifically pleaded. In
analyzing Rule 94's requirement, the court of appeals noted that an af-
firmative defense is one of avoidance rather than a defense of denial.
Kothmann had introduced evidence and proved a valid, existing deed of
trust against the property, thereby establishing a prima facie case of enti-
tlement to an affirmative ruling on the lien priority issues.20 Based on a
general denial, Genesis had the burden of providing rebuttal evidence as
to Kothmann's entitlement to a valid lien; however, Genesis did not at-
tempt to rebut a valid lien, but only offered evidence of a valid transfer-
of-tax lien. The court of appeals concluded that this constituted an af-
firmative defense and not a denial, which would have required a specific
pleading. In the absence of a specific pleading, the general denial waived
the rights to assert the affirmative defense. 21 The court of appeals also
rejected Genesis's theory that the proof of a valid tax-lien transfer was an
inferential rebuttal negating an element of Kothmann's cause of action,
since it represented an independent basis for denying recovery after
13. Id. at 194. The court specifically noted the abstract of judgment was both issued
and recorded after the $500 down payment was made. Id. at 195 n.5.
14. Id.
15. 288 S.W.3d 503 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2009, pet. filed).
16. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 32.065 (Vernon Supp. 2009).
17. Kothmann, 288 S.W.3d at 507.
18. See Tex. TAX CODE ANN. § 32.05 (Vernon 2008).
19. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 94 ("In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth
affirmatively . . . any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.")




Kothmann had established a prima facie case.2 2
Also, the court of appeals addressed whether Genesis's tax liens were
statutorily valid. The affidavit authorizing the transfer-of-tax lien had
been lost by Genesis; therefore, Genesis filed an affidavit attaching a
copy of such affidavit. The court of appeals, in a case of first impression,
framed the issue as whether attaching a copy of the tax collector's certifi-
cation of transfer of tax lien sufficiently complied with section 32.06(d) of
the Texas Tax Code 2 3 to create an enforceable transfer of the tax lien. In
considering this issue, the court of appeals first looked to the Code Con-
struction Act, which requires the use of the plain meaning of words unless
the context requires otherwise. 24 In reviewing the statute, the court of
appeals concluded that it clearly requires (as a condition precedent to
enforceability of the lien) that the tax collector's sworn statement and
affidavit be recorded.25 Citing White v. McCulloch,26 where an affidavit
stating that the affiant once possessed a deed that had been lost and was
not recordable, the court of appeals concluded that, since the underlying
public policy for recordation is to prevent fraud, the filing of a copy of the
tax-transfer affidavit was not valid. 2 7 This rationale seems somewhat
questionable, particularly in light of current recordation practices. The
affidavit in White refers to but does not provide a copy of the deed; that
appears to be significantly different than Kothmann, where a copy of the
transfer of lien was attached to the affidavit. The requirement for an
original document to be recorded is now observed in the breach more
than the compliance, with the advent of electronic filing in most record-
ing offices. In all electronic filings, a document is submitted electronically
so that the recording office does not receive the original document, but
only a copy. This begs the question, then, of what the difference is be-
tween an electronic filing of an original document and the filing of an
affidavit with a copy of the original attached.
The court of appeals next looked to procedures governing lost docu-
ments under section 19.00228 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
Code which specify the process for judicially supplying proof of a lost
record. These provisions apply to any conveyance that is required or per-
mitted by law to be, and has been, acknowledged or recorded.29 This
procedure requires issuance of citation and service of process on inter-
ested parties, with a hearing on the existence and content of the record
and of its laws. The court of appeals noted that Genesis failed to use this
22. Id. at 511.
23. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 32.06(d) (Vernon Supp. 2009), requiring a tax lien
transferee to record a tax lien transferred pursuant to such statute with the sworn state-
ment and affidavit of the tax collector as to the transfer of the tax lien).
24. See TEX. Gov'T. CODE ANN. §§ 311.001-.032 (Vernon 2005), § 311.034 (Vernon
Supp. 2009).
25. Kothmann, 288 S.W.3d at 514.
26. 120 S.W. 1093 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1909, no writ).
27. Kothmann, 288 S.W. 3d at 514.
28. TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 19.002 (Vernon 2008).
29. Id. § 19.001.
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procedure.30 Finally, the court of appeals examined the Tax Code and
concluded there were no provisions preventing Genesis from requesting
and filing a duplicate sworn statement and affidavit from the tax collec-
tor; however, Genesis did not do so. In conclusion, the court of appeals
determined that Genesis did not comply with the strict provisions of the
tax-lien-transfer statute nor did it avail itself of remedies for a lost instru-
ment or the obtainment of a sworn duplicate original; therefore, Genesis
did not establish an enforceable transfer of the tax lien.31
Terra XXI, Ltd. v. Harmon32 involved the interplay between a bank-
ruptcy court reorganization plan and Texas statutory foreclosure proce-
dures. Terra borrowed funds from Ag Services of America, granting a
deed of trust on its property. Later, Terra filed for bankruptcy, which
culminated in a reorganization plan covering the company's debt and an
Agreed Order. After bankruptcy, Terra again defaulted on the loans. At
Ag Services' request, Harmon, as the trustee, proceeded with foreclosure
by sending notice to Terra and then conducting the foreclosure sale. In a
subsequent forcible detainer action, Terra alleged that the reorganization
plan extinguished the deed of trust. The reorganization plan stated,
"[Tihe Debtor shall receive a discharge of and from any debt that arose
before the date of confirmation." 3 3 The Amarillo Court of Appeals read
this in light of other provisions (noted below) and concluded that the
deed of trust was modified, incorporated the terms of the debt pursuant
to the reorganization plan, and did not represent an extinguishment of
the debt and deed of trust.3 4 The reorganization plan contained a list of
defaults, one of which obligated Terra to continue performance of cove-
nants under the loan documents, including the deed of trust. Another
provision granted Ag Services rights and remedies as provided under
Texas law, including the right of non-judicial foreclosure.35
Also, Terra contended that Harmon did not give unequivocal notice of
intent to accelerate as required by Texas law. Terra further alleged that
the notice was not sent to each obligor as required under Texas foreclo-
sure statutes.36 However, the reorganization plan and the Agreed Order
provided that notices sent to Terra would satisfy the notice requirements
under Texas law. Since notices were received by Terra in accordance with
the reorganization plan, the court of appeals concluded that Terra re-
ceived appropriate notice and that the reorganization plan and Agreed
Order took precedence as to Texas statutory foreclosure procedures.3 7
30. Kothmann, 288 S.W.3d at 514.
31. Id.
32. 279 S.W.3d 781 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2007, pet. denied).
33. Id. at 786.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 787.
36. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002(b)(3) (Vernon Supp. 2009).




Austin v. Countrywide Homes Loans38 was chosen for this Article not
because of any jurisprudential novelty, but because of the case's rele-
vance to the significant number of similar issues currently existing in the
marketplace. Austin defaulted on a promissory note held by Country-
wide. Upon suit for collection of the note, Austin raised defenses based
upon whether Countrywide was a valid assignee of the note. The note
was payable to Harbor Financial Mortgage and secured by a deed of
trust. The note was assigned a number of times, resting finally with
Countrywide.39 The trial court granted Countrywide's summary judg-
ment motion for relief, and Austin appealed. The Houston First Court of
Appeals concluded that Countrywide had offered sufficient evidence to
prove its ownership of the note and default by Austin, without contro-
verting evidence presented by Austin, holding that the following three
elements had to be proved: the party is the legal holder of the existing
note, the debtor executed the note, and there is an outstanding balance
due. 40
Countrywide presented affidavit testimony from two officers establish-
ing these elements. The first affidavit presented testimony that Country-
wide was the sole holder of the loan evidenced by the note, reciting the
original note and endorsements. Attached to the affidavit were copies of
the note and deed of trust. Even though one link in the chain of assign-
ments had been lost, Countrywide's affidavit included further testimony
that the original assignment had been duly executed and delivered, had
been subsequently lost or misplaced, and that Countrywide was unable to
locate the assignment despite diligent efforts. The affidavit further af-
firmed that a replacement assignment had been executed and that Coun-
trywide had not assigned, pledged, sold, endorsed or in any way
transferred or hypothecated the note, the deed of trust, or any interest
therein; that no release or modification of the note or deed of trust had
been consented to by Countrywide; and that Countrywide retained the
full right, power and authority to collect the amounts owed under the
note and to foreclose under the deed of trust.41 Countrywide's second
affidavit presented evidence establishing the outstanding balance due on
the note and recited the monthly principal and interest payment amount,
the outstanding principal balance as of the date of the summary judgment
motion, and the total amount due. Further, this affidavit proved Coun-
trywide's payment history regarding the note.
In defense, Austin presented an affidavit entitled "Disputed Facts," but
it failed to verify any of the disputed facts. The supporting documents
were not authenticated and did not raise any issue of ownership of the
note. Therefore, the court of appeals held that the affidavit was insuffi-
38. 261 S.W.3d 68 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. denied).
39. Id. at 71 n.1.
40. Id. at 72.
41. Id. at 73.
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cient as a matter of law.4 2
Next, Austin alleged that the assignment to Countrywide violated the
statute of frauds.43 The current Texas statute of frauds44 makes any real
property conveyance void as to subsequent purchasers for value who take
without notice, unless the prior conveyance instrument is acknowledged
and filed of record. In reviewing this statute, the court of appeals stated
that Austin was a stranger to the assignment and therefore could not in-
voke the protection of the statute of frauds.45
The Austin decision demonstrates what kinds of affidavit testimony are
sufficient to support a summary judgment for a suit on a debt and illus-
trates what items must be negated in the affidavit. Furthermore, assign-
ees who have taken possession of a note and deed of trust pursuant to
unrecorded assignments will find comfort in the ruling, which prohibits
the challenging of such document under the Texas statute of frauds. The
failure to record an assignment of a mortgage or deed of trust is not an
unusual practice in the marketplace, particularly for single-family-hous-
ing mortgage loans. Therefore, this opinion could be significant to nu-
merous similar fact situations.
Another statute of frauds case relating to a loan agreement is ad-
dressed in Bank of Texas v. Gaubert.46 The applicable statute of frauds
provides: "A loan agreement in which the amount involved in the loan
agreement exceeds $50,000 in value is not enforceable unless the agree-
ment is in writing and signed by the party to be bound or by that party's
authorized representative." 4 7 The Gaubert case involves the back-and-
forth communication concerning the extension of a loan which matured
on January 3, 2008. From that date until June 30, 2008, the parties fre-
quently discussed extending the debt's maturity date. In early January,
the bank contacted the borrower to discuss a loan extension and re-
quested financial statements. The borrower responded and discussed the
terms of the extension. On February 1, 2008, there was an email concern-
ing an interest payment, and an oral conversation regarding whether in-
terest needed to be paid because of the pending loan extension. Later,
the bank's loan officer sent a letter confirming that a loan extension was
in process. On March 6, the bank provided a letter confirming that the
matured loan was in the process of being extended. Subsequently, the
bank officer sent an email indicating the loan extension approval had al-
most been approved. Then, in early April, the bank delivered the draft
loan extension documents to the borrower; however, these documents
were unacceptable to the borrower because they did not capitalize ex-
42. Id.
43. The court of appeals never stated that the assignment documents were not re-
corded of record, but that assumption can be made based upon the various statements in
the opinion and from this point of error raised by Austin. Id. at 74.
44. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 13.001 (Vernon 2004).
45. Austin, 261 S.W.3d at 74.
46. 286 S.W.3d 546 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2009, pet. dism'd w.o.j.).
47. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.02 (Vernon 2009).
764 [Vol. 63
isting property taxes and accrued but unpaid interest on the loan. In late
April, after the bank announced that it did not intend to extend the loan
after all, the borrower alleged that the bank misled the borrower, causing
him to believe the bank would make the loan extension. Ultimately the
bank posted the property for a July 1 foreclosure sale; the borrower filed
suit, obtaining a temporary restraining order stopping the foreclosure.
The bank defended against the borrower's argument that a loan exten-
sion had been agreed to, invoking the statute of frauds.
The Dallas Court of Appeals looked first at Texas's traditional statute
of frauds. 48 The court of appeals noted two exceptions (promissory es-
toppel and partial performance) that would allow the enforcement of oral
agreements. 49 After examining existing case law, the court of appeals
concluded that no cases had expressly held that the promissory estoppel
and partial performance exceptions applied to section 26.02 of the Texas
and Business Commerce Code.50 The court of appeals declined to decide
whether the equitable exceptions to the traditional statute of frauds
would also apply to section 26.02, and it instead examined the case from a
factual perspective. The borrower asserted that the oral agreements
made by the bank should be enforced; however, he did not allege that the
letter regarding the extension was an agreement signed by the bank and
was a writing under section 26.02.51
With respect to the promissory estoppel exception, the court of appeals
held that it applied "when the alleged oral promise is to sign an existing
document that satisfies the statute of frauds." 52 The borrower never testi-
fied that the bank promised to sign an existing writing; rather, his argu-
ment rested upon an allegation of an agreement to extend the loan.
Furthermore, the court of appeals pointed out that it was the borrower
who refused to sign the draft loan documents. Consequently, the court of
appeals concluded that the record contained "no evidence [indicating] the
bank promised to sign an existing writing"; therefore, this exception to
the statute of frauds was not available.53
The court of appeals likewise concluded that the partial-performance
exception was not supported by the record.54 Partial performance can be
used to enforce an oral agreement only if denying enforcement would
amount to a fraud, and the partial performance must unequivocally be
referable to the alleged oral agreement and must corroborate the agree-
ment's existence.55 The borrower's partial performance consisted of re-
taining a real estate agent, finishing construction on the house and pool,
landscaping, and paying utility and insurance costs. These actions,
48. See id. § 26.01(a).
49. Gaubert, 286 S.W.3d at 553.
50. Id. at 554.
51. Id. at 555 & n.7.
52. Id. at 553.
53. Id. at 555.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 554.
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though, occurred after the bank advised that it would not extend the loan.
Therefore, the court of appeals concluded these actions could not have
been taken in reliance upon an earlier oral agreement to extend the
loan.5 6 While the court's conclusion may have been supported by the
evidence, the opinion clearly portends some areas in which the borrower
could have improved his position. First and foremost, the borrower did
not focus on any of the written documents provided by the bank as con-
stituting a written agreement to extend the loan.
The borrower also argued that the facts represented an oral extension
of the time for performance; however, the court of appeals interpreted
the statute of frauds contained in section 26.02 as more exacting than
section 26.01.57 Section 26.02 specifically deals with a loan agreement by
a financial institution involving an agreement to delay repayment of
money, specifying that such agreement is unenforceable unless in writing
and signed by the party to be bound.58 Applying the stricter reading, the
extension of time for performance by an oral communication would be
unenforceable under the subject statute. The borrower also argued that
the bank statements constituted a negligent misrepresentation sufficient
to avoid the statute of frauds. The court of appeals concluded that avoid-
ance was available where the application would work a fraud, but not
upon mere negligence; to hold otherwise would allow artful pleadings to
morph contract claims into fraud cases. 59 Consequently, the court of ap-
peals rejected the borrower's claim for an exception to the statute of
frauds based on negligent misrepresentation. 60
IV. GUARANTIES
Recourse carve-out provisions for waste and intentional misrepresenta-
tion are discussed in U.S. Bank National Association v. American Re-
alty.61 This case involves the Kansas City International Airport Holiday
Inn, owned by K.C. Airport Hotel, Inc., an affiliate of American Realty
Trust, and financed by U.S. Bank. The borrower defaulted, and after
foreclosure, U.S. Bank sued American Realty as a guarantor, alleging lia-
bility under certain carve-out exceptions for waste and material misrepre-
sentation. The basis for these claims related to the change of the hotel's
affiliation with Holiday Inn to Clarion. Since the Holiday Inn franchise
was more valuable than the Clarion franchise, U.S. Bank alleged it was
damaged by the change. The Holiday Inn franchise was to expire Sep-
tember, 2002. A year earlier, Holiday Inn had notified the borrower of
the upcoming expiration and required a new property inspection to
relicense the hotel. After inspection of the property, Holiday Inn re-
56. Id. at 555.
57. Id. 556.
58. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.02(a)(2) (Vernon 2009).
59. Gaubert, 286 S.W.3d at 556.
60. Id.
61. 275 S.W.3d 647 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2009, pet. denied).
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quired improvements estimated at $1,800,000. The borrower decided this
was too expensive and negotiated a Clarion Hotel franchise instead,
which required less than $400,000 in improvements. After the change in
hotel affiliation, the revenues dropped significantly, and the borrower
was unable to service the debt and eventually defaulted.
U.S. Bank asserted that the borrower's actions constituted waste under
the guaranty. 62 The guarantor contended that waste was not applicable
since a showing of waste required actual, physical damage to the hotel
and that it could not include any future franchise license. The Dallas
Court of Appeals noted that the guaranty contained language relating to
waste to the "Property" and examined other documents to determine the
definition of "Property." "Property" was defined in the other documents
as not only the physical land and improvements, but all contractual agree-
ments, including franchise agreements and license agreements with hotel
franchisors, and general intangibles such as service marks and trade
names. 6 3 Additionally, the court of appeals noted that there were no con-
tractual covenants requiring the borrower to reapply for a Holiday Inn
franchise upon expiration of the current license. In conclusion, the court
of appeals determined that while future potential franchise agreements
may become "Property" within the definition in the loan documents, a
distinction had to be drawn between breaching an existing franchise
agreement and the nonrenewal of an existing franchise or non-application
for a new franchise. Since the existing franchise agreement expired on its
own terms without a covenant to renew, the borrower did not waste any
of the "Property." In reaching that conclusion, the court of appeals did
not address whether waste could relate only to damages for physical
property or could include intangibles such as existing franchise licenses.64
This result highlights certain practical considerations in drafting loan doc-
uments. First, "waste" needs to be more clearly defined, specifying
whether it relates to physical assets only or would also include contractual
agreements and general intangibles. Second, covenants for renewal of
existing licenses may be critical provisions upon the expiration of existing
franchise licenses.
Next, the court of appeals looked at whether recourse liability was
available to U.S. Bank under the material misrepresentation provisions of
the guaranty. 65 The basis for the misrepresentation was a July 24, 2002
letter from the borrower stating that Holiday Inn had decided not to re-
new the license agreement. A May 2, 2002 letter from Holiday Inn stated
its intention not to renew the license, but testimony showed the letter was
62. The applicable provision of the guaranty provided liability for "[w]aste committed
on the Property . . . to the full extent of the losses or damages incurred by Lender on
account of such waste." Id. at 650.
63. Id. at 650-51.
64. Id. at 651.
65. The applicable recourse provision in the guaranty provides that the guarantor
would be liable for "material misrepresentation by Borrower or any of its principals, of-
ficers or partners . . . to the full extent of any losses, damages, and expenses of Lender on
account thereof." Id. at 653.
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a mere formality to comply with state franchise laws. Further evidence at
trial showed that on July 15, 2002, the borrower, in a telephone conversa-
tion, advised Holiday Inn that the borrower had no intention of renewing
the license because of the large improvement costs involved and that he
was instead seeking another franchise. This conversation was memorial-
ized in a letter. Therefore, the misrepresentation made to the lender by
the borrower was that Holiday Inn had refused to renew the license,
when in fact it was the borrower who had determined not to renew with
Holiday Inn. The trial court found that the damages incurred by the dim-
inution in value from operating the hotel under a Holiday Inn flag as
opposed to a Clarion flag were not directly caused by the borrower's mis-
representation. The court of appeals agreed.66 Since there was no con-
tractual requirement for the hotel to remain with the Holiday Inn
franchise, and the lender had no interest in any future franchise licensing
agreement, the court of appeals concluded that the misrepresentations
did not relate to any covenant or requirement that borrower was
breaching. 67
V. USURY
Kennon v. McGraw68 deals with the spreading doctrine and a savings
clause, but in neither case did the court get it correct. McGraw bought a
house from Kennon, financing the purchase with a note and deed of trust.
Ultimately, McGraw defaulted on the note, and Kennon sent a demand
letter seeking collection of amounts due. When those amounts went un-
paid, Kennon foreclosed, and McGraw alleged usury. As to the spread-
ing component of the case, Kennon charged interest of nearly $18,000
over a period extending from the execution of the note in March 1995
through its acceleration in March 2000. The trial court held that the max-
imum allowable interest was approximately $14,000, and that the balance
was usurious. The note carried an original fifteen-year term, and Kennon
alleged that the spreading doctrine requires calculation of interest for
usury purposes over the entire term, rather than limiting the spreading to
the date of acceleration, which was five years. The Eastland Court of
Appeals referred to Nevels v. Harris,69 which first recognized the spread-
ing doctrine and which subsequently has been codified.70 Subsection (a)
of the spreading statute provides that, to determine usury, the interest
contracted for, charged, or received is spread over the entire stated term
of the loan.7' The usurious amount was based on past-due interest being
calculated on the entire principal balance and not the past-due payment
amounts. Reading the narrow provisions of subsection (a), the court of
appeals concluded the "statute's mandatory language and its broad refer-
66. Id. at 654.
67. Id.
68. 281 S.W.3d 648 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2009, no pet.).
69. 102 S.W.2d 1046, 1049 (1937).




ence to all interest contracted for, charged, or received" applied not only
to the interpretation of the written agreement, but impliedly to interest
actually charged.7 2 As to the time period for application of the spreading
doctrine, the court of appeals concluded that using the five-year, acceler-
ated maturity date was error and that the fifteen-year term should have
been used.7 3
McGraw contended that the spreading doctrine should be used only to
determine a "contracting for" determination of usury.74 The codified
spreading doctrine provides for spreading "all interest at any time con-
tracted for, charged, or received in connection with the loan."75 The
court of appeals cited Tanner for the proposition that spreading over the
entire term of the loan is appropriate.7 6 But the court of appeals misses
the point of the spreading statute and of Tanner. First, the court of ap-
peals totally ignores the second prong of the spreading statute, which
deals with payment prior to the full stated term of the note.77 That sub-
section embellishes on the general spreading concept for a full-term loan
and provides that, where the loan term is shortened by prepayment or
acceleration, the interest amount received in excess of the maximum rate
must be refunded to the debtor or credited against the principal amount
on the debt.78 In applying the principles of the spreading statute dealing
with a full-term loan (as opposed to the subsection of the spreading stat-
ute dealing with a shortened loan term) to the situation in which the loan
term is shortened by prepayment or acceleration, the court of appeals has
reached an incorrect conclusion. Its reliance on Tanner is also unjustified,
because in that case, the note at issue was accelerated prior to its full
stated term due to the note maker's default.79 The Tanner court held that
the note was not usurious as originally "contracted for" when the interest
was spread over the full term of the note, and that upon default and ac-
celeration, since the prepaid interest spread over the shortened term
which was in excess of the maximum allowable rate was used to reduce
the principal balance, no usurious interest was "received" by the
creditor.s0
In other words, the McGraw court failed to make the vital distinction
between determining usury based on a "contracting for," as opposed to
"receiving," interest. The court of appeals should have first determined
that the contract was non-usurious based on the amount of interest con-
tracted for over the full term of the note; then, it should have determined
72. Kennon, 281 S.W.3d at 651.
73. Id. at 653 (citing Tanner Dev. Co. v. Ferguson, 561 S.W.2d 777, 779 (Tex. 1977)).
74. Id. at 651. However, note that the court used the term "charges" when it discussed
whether Kennon actually followed the note's provisions. This should have been a "con-
tracting for," as opposed to a "charging," analysis. See id. at 652.
75. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 302.101(a).
76. Kennon, 281 S.W.3d at 653.
77. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 302.101(b).
78. Id.
79. Tanner Dev. Co. v. Ferguson, 561 S.W.2d 777, 780 (Tex. 1977).
80. Id. at 781-82.
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what interest was actually received (and not refunded to the maker or
applied against the principal balance) during the actual term and whether
the actual amount received over the period was usurious.
Kennon also asserted the usury savings clause precluded McGraw's
usury claim. The note contained a somewhat typical usury savings clause,
and the court should have held usury, based on the trial court's conclu-
sion that the note was accelerated without Kennon reimbursing any ex-
cess interest paid. The court of appeals instead incorrectly focused on
whether Kennon's actions resulted from accident or bona fide error. The
court of appeals discussed Kennon's method of charging default interest
based on the entire principal amount and not on the past due principal
and interest.81 While the issues and briefs presented to the court of ap-
peals may have been misleading, the court could have easily determined
that, as a matter of law, usury on a prepaid note would be determined in
accordance with the provisions of the Texas spreading statute, rather than
running down the rabbit trail of accident and bona fide error.
VI. CONSTRUCTION MATTERS
In Medistar Corp. v. Schmidt,82 the San Antonio Court of Appeals
held that a letter of intent for the development of a medical facility was
not a binding contract. The letter of intent related to an integrated medi-
cal plaza to be constructed next to the San Antonio Spurs training facility.
Medistar, which had been discussing the project with Dr. Schmidt, sent a
letter of intent that Schmidt signed and returned. The trial court granted
summary judgment for Schmidt, holding that there was no evidence of a
binding contract, and Medistar appealed. The letter provided that Medis-
tar would acquire the property, develop the project, obtain all necessary
approvals and permits, assume financial responsibility, and participate in
the ownership interest of the project. But, based on the letter's specific
provisions, the court of appeals concluded that the parties did not intend
to be bound by the letter. "The . .. letter [of intent] plainly state[d] in
bold print that its content[s] [were] 'Preliminary-For Discussion Only.'
Moreover, the letter include[d] the following statements: 'this is Medis-
tar's preliminary proposal for your review'; 'we are also attaching very
preliminary financial information'; and 'we look forward to further dis-
cussions with you to refine our proposal according to the needs and goals
of the Physicians.'" 8 3 Furthermore, testimony acknowledging that the
letter of intent "constituted a binding agreement" was not sufficient to
overcome its unambiguous contents.84 While this holding is not necessa-
rily unique, it provides valuable instruction on how to draft a letter to be
either a non-binding letter of intent or a binding contract.
81. Kennon, 281 S.W.3d at 652.
82. 267 S.W.3d 150 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2008, pet. denied).
83. Id. at 158.
84. Id. at 158 n.2.
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West v. Triple B Services, LLP 85 addresses whether construction was
timely completed. Classic, subdivision owner, contracted with Triple B to
construct a lift station. Plans for the station were prepared by Carter &
Burgess, and ultimately the City of Houston approved the plans. The
approved plans formed the basis of the winning bid by Triple B. The
construction contract with Triple B provided for substantial completion
within 120 days after commencement. Upon receiving the notice to pro-
ceed, Triple B attempted to obtain a construction permit, but the city
refused to issue one because its initial approval of the plans was not made
with the understanding that it would ultimately acquire the facility and be
responsible for it. The city insisted it would now require higher-standard
specifications. Based on the revised plans, Triple B increased its price by
$75,000, and the parties entered into a change order reflecting the price
increase. They failed, however, to address any extension of the construc-
tion time in the contract. During construction, additional delays occurred
resulting in completion of the lift station one year after commencement.
When a final-draw request was submitted by Triple B, Classic refused to
pay because of the delay in completion. Classic appealed an award in
favor of Triple B alleging there was insufficient evidence that Triple B
timely completed construction of the lift station under the contract. Clas-
sic claimed that while Triple B had requested and received extensions for
other reasons, Triple B never requested additional contract time for the
delay in obtaining the construction permit.86 Classic also relied on Triple
B's final-draw request, which contained a field of information indicating
that Triple B was ninety-two days past the completion deadline.
One element of a breach-of-contract claim requires a party to establish
that the plaintiff tendered performance or was excused from doing so. 87
The material breach of a contract by one party excuses the other party
from further performance.88 The Houston Fourteenth Court of Appeals
concluded there was sufficient evidence of a material breach by Classic to
excuse Triple B from performance.8 9 The evidence showed Triple B's
performance under the contract was conditioned upon adequate and ap-
proved plans, that such plans were inadequate at the time the contract
was consummated, that the inadequate plans prevented Triple B from ob-
taining a permit to commence construction of the lift station, and that
despite a notice to proceed, the failure to obtain a permit prevented the
timely commencement of construction. These facts overruled the con-
tractual provisions which otherwise provided that the contractor was re-
quired to stop work and notify the engineer upon discovery of any
conflict, error, ambiguity, or discrepancy with the contract documents,
and not to proceed until an amendment or supplement had been issued in
85. 264 S.W.3d 440 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.).
86. Id. at 447.
87. Id. at 446.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 450.
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accordance with the contract. 90
VII. PURCHASER/SELLER
Numerous cases decided during the Survey period deal with specific
performance of breached contracts to convey real estate. Of those,
Lovett v. Lovett91 contains the best discussion of the partial-performance
exception to the statute of frauds. Louis Lovett lived in Arizona with his
wife and entered into an oral agreement with Peter Lovett to share costs
for the acquisition of Texas real estate in exchange for one-half of legal
title to the property. Peter purchased the property, and Louis made the
agreed payments, which consisted of a down payment of $4,200, $500 for
an appraisal, and monthly interest payments of $210 for approximately
eight years. Louis also paid real estate taxes for at least three years. Pe-
ter, however, contended that the oral agreement related to a second tract
of property which Louis had not purchased. The lawsuit followed, and
the Waco Court of Appeals considered whether Louis had met the par-
tial-performance requirements to take the oral agreement outside the
statute of frauds. The elements of the partial performance defense are:
"(1) payment of consideration; (2) possession of the property by the
buyer; and (3) permanent and valuable improvements by the buyer with
the consent of seller or other facts demonstrating that the buyer would be
defrauded if the agreement were not enforced." 92
There is no dispute that Louis made the payments mentioned above
and moved from Arizona to occupy the house in Texas, satisfying the first
two elements of the partial-performance exception. The controversy re-
lated to satisfaction of the third element. Since Louis apparently made
no improvements to the property, the court of appeals focused on
whether the buyer "would be defrauded if the [oral] agreement was not
enforced." 93 In the original opinion by the court of appeals, it held that
the payments made to satisfy the first element were also sufficient to es-
tablish the third. In dissent, Chief Justice Gray objected to this dual
use.9 4 In its subsequent opinion, the court of appeals changed its posi-
tion, concluding that the move by Louis from Arizona to Texas was a
serious change of position in reliance upon the oral contract, and that the
payment of ad valorem taxes for at least three years satisfied the third
element. The dissenting opinion by Chief Justice Gray again took issue
with the majority holding that the same factual basis-the relocation
from Arizona to Texas-could be used to satisfy both the second element
of possession and the third element of a substantial change of position in
reliance.
The Texas Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion in In re Bank of
90. Id. at 448-49.
91. 283 S.W.3d 391 (Tex. App.-Waco 2008, no pet.)
92. Id. at 394.
93. Id. at 398.
94. Id. at 396 (Gray, J., dissenting).
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America, N.A.,95 effectively overruled Mikey's Houses LLC v. Bank of
America,96 which was reported in a previous year's Survey article. 97
These cases relate to the validity of a jury-waiver clause. Mikey's Houses
contracted to purchase a house from Bank of America, and an addendum
to the agreement contained a jury-waiver clause. The addendum was
presented and signed after the contract. The Fort Worth Court of Ap-
peals addressed the issue of whether there was a rebuttable presumption
against waiver that had to be overcome by Bank of America, examining
seven specific factors as to whether there was a knowing and voluntary
waiver. The court of appeals concluded that the presumption against
waiver was not appropriately rebutted.98 The supreme court addressed
whether a jury-trial waiver in a real estate contract creates a presumption
that places a burden on the seller to prove the purchaser's knowing and
voluntary agreement to the waiver, and it clarified that In re PrudentiaP9
does not impose a presumption against a contractual jury waiver.
The jury-waiver provision'00 was found in the contract addendum,
which contained twenty numbered and separately spaced paragraphs, five
of which had bolded titles, including the jury-waiver provision. The su-
preme court reviewed its decision in In re Prudential, which relied upon
Brady v. United States'(o and In re General Electric Capital Corp.102 Con-
tractual jury waivers were held not to violate public policy and were held
enforceable in In re Prudential.03 In explaining why a presumption
against jury waiver was inappropriate, the supreme court first pointed to
General Electric, dealing with burden-shifting rules on presumption in
contractual jury waivers. The General Electric case held that "a conspicu-
ous provision is prima facie evidence of a knowing and voluntary waiver
and shifts the burden to the opposing party to rebut it."104 Therefore, the
General Electric rule required only a showing of a conspicuous provision
to enforce the contractual jury waiver, and such conspicuousness was
demonstrated in the Mikey's Houses case. The supreme court approved
of the definition of "conspicuous" in the Texas Business and Commerce
Code 05 and approved of its prior holding in Prudential, where the waiver
95. 278 S.W.3d 342 (Tex. 2009).
96. 232 S.W.3d 145 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2007), opinion withdrawn and superseded,
278 S.W.3d 927 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2009, no pet.).
97. See J. Richard White & G. Roland Love, Real Property, 61 SMU L. REv. 1073
(2008).
98. Mikey's Houses, 232 S.W.3d at 150-57.
99. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124 (Tex. 2004).
100. The exact waiver provision was: "13. Waiver of Trial by Jury. Seller and Buyer
knowingly and conclusively waive all rights to trial by jury, in any action or proceeding
relating to this Contract." In re Bank of Am., 278 S.W.3d at 343.
101. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
102. 203 S.W.3d 314 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam).
103. In re Prudential,148 S.W.3d at 132.
104. In re Bank of Am., 278 S.W.3d at 344 (quoting In re Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 203
S.W.3d at 316).
105. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.201(b)(10) (Vernon 2009) (defining "con-
spicuous" as meaning "written, displayed, or presented that a reasonable person against
which it is to operate ought to have noticed it").
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provision was "'crystal clear' because 'it was not printed in small type or
hidden in lengthy text"' and contained a bold type title heading in the
paragraph in which the waiver was included.'0 6 In General Electric, the
waiver provision "was conspicuous because it was set apart from the rest
of the text and printed in bold with all capital letters." 07 In the Mikey's
Houses case, the jury-waiver provision was conspicuous, being a separate
paragraph with a bolded introductory title, manual underlining of the
paragraph heading, and the words "waiver" and "trial by jury" in the pro-
vision. Having determined that the waiver was conspicuous, there
needed to be a showing of fraud or imposition connected to the waiver to
shift the burden to the other party.108 In addressing the fraud or imposi-
tion provision, the supreme court noted testimony that Mikey's Houses'
representatives testified that they had the opportunity to review the ad-
dendum, that Bank of America had not rushed Mikey's Houses' repre-
sentatives into signing the addendum, and that Mikey's Houses'
representatives believed they could have retained counsel to review the
provision. 109 However, the supreme court "held that general allegations
of fraud were not sufficient to shift the burden" of a knowing and volun-
tary waiver.'10 The supreme court further supported its position by not-
ing the similarity between arbitration clauses and jury-waiver provisions,
and concluded it would be inappropriate to make a distinction between
the two.111 Private dispute-resolution agreements have been historically
favored, as evidenced in Prudential and Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.112
The supreme court held that as with arbitration clauses, contractual
waiver provisions should likewise be favored."13
VIII. LEASES; LANDLORD/TENANT
In Besteman v. Pitcock,114 the Texarkana Court of Appeals examined
whether a notice to purchase property pursuant to a purchase option con-
tained in a lease agreement was properly exercised. Besteman owned
land that Pitcock wanted to buy; Besteman refused to sell it, but as an
alternative offered a two-year lease with an option to purchase at the end
of the lease term. The option provision required Pitcock to "notify Les-
sor of Lessee's intent to purchase said property" within ninety days
before the twenty-four month lease period expired. 115 The lease also
106. In re Bank of Am., 278 S.W.3d at 344.
107. Id. (citing In re Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 203 S.W.3d at 316).




111. Id. at 346.
112. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
113. In re Bank of Am., 278 S.W.3d at 346.
114. 272 S.W.3d 777 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2008, no pet.).
115. Id. at 781.
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contained a somewhat standard notice provision." 6 Both parties ac-
knowledged that there was never a written notice of intent delivered dur-
ing the time specified in the lease. Nevertheless, Pitcock alleged that the
last sentence of the notice provision, which provided that a notice deliv-
ered other than as specified in the provision was "effective upon receipt,"
controlled. Pitcock also argued he had given oral notices of his intention
to purchase prior to the stated time. While the trial court found the oral
notifications were sufficient, the court of appeals reviewed that finding de
novo. To give effect to Pitcock's argument, the court of appeals said,
would have "completely negate[d] the first sentence of the paragraph,
which plainly state[d] that all notices must 'be in writing."" 17 To con-
strue the first sentence otherwise, the court of appeals determined, would
"violate one of the principal tenets of contract construction," which re-
quires courts to consider the entire writing and to attempt to "harmonize
and give effect to all provisions of the contract so that none will be ren-
dered meaningless."' 1 8 Consequently, under the contract "it was neces-
sary to deliver a written notice of the exercise of the option before the
right to purchase under the contract [was] invoked."119 This case reminds
practitioners to be careful when drafting of "boilerplate" provisions like
the notice provision, for as Besteman forewarns, unintended conse-
quences can arise.
IX. TITLE MATTERS
A. ADVERSE POSSESSION/TITLE DISPUTES
Adverse possession is an often litigated issue, but during the Survey
period there were few reported decisions. Kazmir v. Benavides, however,
reminds practitioners of an important concept related to the ten-year
"naked possession" limitations. 120 "Any ouster by the record title holder
after the ten-year limitations period comes too late."121 At that time, title
by limitations has already vested. Also of interest, occupation which be-
gan via a contract for deed which was not performed did not preclude
adverse possession and, in fact, provided the claim of right to the prop-
erty.122 The fact that the purchaser under the contract for deed had
leased the property to another did not preclude a finding of adverse
possession.123
116. The notice provision read as follows: "Any notice required, or permitted to be
delivered hereunder must be in writing, . . . deposited in the United States mail, certified
mail or registered mail, postage prepaid, return receipt requested, addressed to Lessor or
Lessee, as the case may be . . . . Notices delivered otherwise will be effective upon re-
ceipt." Id.
117. Id. at 785.
118. Id. (quoting Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 636, 642 (Tex. 2005)).
119. Id.
120. 288 S.W.3d 557 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.); see TEX. CIV. P.
& REM. CODE ANN. § 16.026 (Vernon 2002).
121. 288 S.W.3d at 561.
122. Id. at 564.
123. Id. at 562-63.
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On a procedural front, two cases were also informative. In Gutierrez v.
People's Management of Texas I, Ltd., two tracts were subject to adverse-
possession claims.124 The El Paso Court of Appeals held that the trial
court had erred by submitting the adverse-possession question as a single
issue and that each tract required a separate jury question.125 Also, in
Wood v. Walker, the Amarillo Court of Appeals pointed out the need to
have an accurate legal description in order to establish adverse posses-
sion, public roadway, or any other claim to real property.126 This case
actually involved a public right-of-way easement across some ranch prop-
erty, and the court of appeals held that the failure to offer a sufficient
description of the road precluded a claim for relief.127 This has been a
common theme in adverse possession and straightforward title disputes.
In the area of title disputes, four cases are worthy of noting: One deals
with bad drafting, another reinforces the concept that refusing to partially
release an abstract of judgment against a homestead might constitute a
slander of title, a third arguably provides new requirements to "prove-
up" the contents of a document lost by the county clerk prior to record-
ing, and a fourth uses real property to decide a personal property title
issue.
First, in Hoke v. O'Bryen, the San Antonio Court of Appeals inter-
preted a survivorship clause in a will.12 8 In a dispute involving an obvi-
ously close-knit extended family, following the death of Mildred Hoke,
Mildred's second husband claimed a fee simple estate in a piece of Texas
property that was left to Mildred by her first husband, Robert Hoke.129
But Mildred's and Robert's two sons contended that their mother had
only a fee simple determinable in the Texas property, with the remainder
passing to them upon her death. 130 Robert's will included a provision for
simultaneous death of the testator and his wife, which stated that "in the
event of the simultaneous death of myself and my wife from any cause
whatsoever, or upon the death of the survivor of us, it is my will that all of
my property shall be divided equally between my two sons."1'3 This pro-
vision arguably conflicted with a paragraph in the will which stated, "I
give, devise and bequeath all of my property of whatsoever kind, both
real and personal and mixed, to my beloved wife Mildred F. Hoke, to be
hers absolutely forever."132 In its analysis, the court of appeals noted that
generally, "the greatest estate will be conferred on a devisee that the
terms of a devise permit," and any condition that would defeat a clearly
124. 277 S.W.3d 72 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2009, pet. denied).
125. Id. at 79-80.
126. 279 S.W.3d 705 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2007, no pet.).
127. Id. at 714.
128. 281 S.W.3d 457 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2007, no pet.).






granted estate must be strictly construed.133 Essentially, an estate given
in one part of the will in clear and decisive terms will not be diminished
by subsequent words that are not equally clear and decisive.134 Thus, the
court of appeals held that Robert's will resulted in the passing of fee sim-
ple absolute to his wife and not just a life estate with a remainder to their
sons. 135
Also, in Ramsey v. Davis,136 the Dallas Court of Appeals reaffirmed
the holding in Tarrant Bank v. Miller13 7 that the refusal to release a lien
created by an abstract judgment on a homestead, when the refusal results
in a loss of sale, can constitute slander of title.s38 Practitioners should be
aware that there is an attorney general's opinion that casts doubt on this
theory, but certainly the court's decision in Ramsey will bring additional
credence to the slander of title claim. 139 Of note, the court of appeals
stated that Ramsey filed an abstract of judgment "against the Davises'
Edgewater home," when in actuality an abstract of judgment is filed and
indexed under the name of the debtor and constitutes a lien against all
property of the debtor.140 Thus, the court of appeals overstated the situa-
tion when it indicated that Ramsey filed an abstract of judgment against
the Davises' homestead. The court of appeals should have instead fo-
cused on Ramsey's failure to provide a partial release of lien when re-
quested in connection with the sale of the homestead.141 The court of
appeals held, however, that Ramsey knew the property was the Davises'
homestead and that his declining to release the lien and requirement of
payment of money constituted a slander of title and, in this case, was also
willful and malicious conduct.142
Also of importance, the Amarillo Court of Appeals created a new stan-
dard and requirement for proof of lost documents.143 In Kothmann, doc-
umentation for a transferred tax lien was forwarded to the county clerk
for recording and was lost. A photocopy of the transferred tax lien was
then recorded with an affidavit of fact proving up the documents. The
court of appeals held that the transferee was required to use the proce-
dures of Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 19 to prove up
the document or obtain a duplicate sworn statement and affidavit.144 It is
not unusual for county clerks to lose documents before recording, and, in
the past, it has been an accepted practice to record a photocopy with an
133. Id. at 460-61 (quoting Benson v. Greenville Nat'l Exch. Bank, 253 S.W.2d 918, 922
(Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1952, writ ref d n.r.e.)).
134. Id. at 461.
135. Id.
136. 261 S.W.3d 811 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, pet. denied).
137. 833 S.W.2d 666 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1992, writ denied).
138. Ramsey, 261 S.W.3d at 812.
139. See Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. DM-366, 3, 6 (1995).
140. Ramsey, 261 S.W.3d at 814.
141. See id. at 818.
142. Id.
143. See Kothmann v. Genesis Tax Loan Servs., Inc., 288 S.W.3d 503, 514 (Tex. App.-




affidavit of fact. This case is currently before the Texas Supreme Court
but could create a new obligation in connection with lost documents even
when photocopies are available.
Finally, in a criminal case, Ingram v. State, the defendant argued that
stolen property was actually abandoned. 1 4 5 However, the defendant had
trespassed upon "abandoned" real property to take the personal prop-
erty. The Tyler Court of Appeals noted that title to real property can
never be abandoned, and that the owner possesses a greater right to per-
sonal property located thereon. 1 46 By trespassing, the defendant acted
wrongfully and could not take possession of "apparently" abandoned per-
sonal property.14 7
B. DEEDS AND CONVEYANCES
During the Survey period, a number of cases dealt with deed construc-
tion, and these cases provide guidance on how "not to" draft. Others
demonstrate traps for the unwary. First, in Graham-Rutledge & Co., Inc.
v. Nadia Corp., the Dallas Court of Appeals held unenforceable a right of
first refusal in a commercial lease.148 Moreover, the court of appeals
stated that the tenant failed to properly exercise any right of first refusal,
if one even existed.149 The lease stated:
Notwithstanding the [sic] anything herein subject Commercial Real
Estate Lease shall be amended and/or modified to include Tenant's
First Right of Refusal given Landlord's desire to sale [sic] said Prop-
erty. In such case, subject Lease Agreement shall be construed as a
"Lease-Purchse [sic] Option Contract." 50
The court of appeals held this provision to be unenforceably vague.151
Moreover, the tenant's written offer to purchase the land failed to match
or better the terms of the third-party offer.1 5 2 It appears that this com-
mercial lease agreement was drafted without legal assistance, but this
case still provides some instruction regarding the need for precision when
drafting right-of-first-refusal provisions.
In Bowers v. Taylor, the Houston First Court of appeals addressed the
rule against perpetuities and how to avoid the rule's pitfalls by drafting
properly.15 3 This case involved an oil and gas lease and reminds a practi-
tioner that an oil and gas lease actually grants a mineral interest in fee
simple determinable to the lessee.154 Accordingly, the oil and gas lessor
is entitled to sell or assign the possibility of reverter, which was at issue in
145. 261 S.W.3d 749 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2008, no pet.).
146. Id. at 754.
147. Id.
148. 281 S.W.3d 683, 690-91 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2009, no pet.).
149. Id. at 686-87, 690.
150. Id. at 686.
151. Id. at 690.
152. Id. at 689.
153. 263 S.W.3d 260 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.).
154. See id. at 265.
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this case.155 The court of appeals held that the possibility of reverter was
a presently vested interest and not a springing executory interest that vio-
lated the rule against perpetuities. 56
In Eastin v. Dial, the danger of vacating a court decision as part of a
settlement came to bear. 57 In this case, Eastin had obtained a successful
judgment canceling a 1983 deed, but as part of a settlement, Eastin had
vacated the judgment canceling the deed. On its face within the "four
corners," the 1983 deed conveyed all of the rights in the property, includ-
ing the grantor's interest in the mineral estate. As the San Antonio Court
of Appeals noted, a deed will be construed to confer upon the grantee the
greatest estate that the terms of the instrument will permit, and only clear
language showing an intention to grant a lesser estate is effective.158
Thus, the 1983 deed superseded any prior or different agreement, and a
more limiting 1984 deed became rather meaningless.
In the Waco Court of Appeals case, Givings v. Ward, the grantor
sought reformation of a deed based on an underlying contract by which
the mineral rights would have been reserved to the vendor.159 In defense,
the grantee raised the merger doctrine, along with a lack of mutual mis-
take.160 As the court of appeals noted, merger did not bar reformation to
correct a mutual mistake made in preparing a written instrument to re-
flect the agreement of the parties. 161 Moreover, the court of appeals rec-
ognized that a unilateral mistake by one party, and knowledge of that
mistake by the other party, is equivalent to mutual mistake. 162
In Watson v. Tipton, yet another case on good practices, the Fort Worth
Court of Appeals addressed delivery of a deed and its significance. 16 3 In
particular, the court of appeals stated that recording created a presump-
tion of delivery but that even an unrecorded deed, if delivered, was bind-
ing on the parties to the deed.164 Likewise, contrary to an often
misunderstood belief, the court of appeals noted that consideration is not
necessary to support a deed and transfer of title.165 This case emphasizes
the danger of "delivering" a deed to be held by another to secure a per-
formance of some other act.
Finally, in a case arising in the sovereign immunity and takings environ-
ment, the Dallas Court of Appeals pointed out that deed restrictions re-
quiring unrestricted access to a state highway were unenforceable
155. See id.
156. Id. at 266.
157. 288 S.W.3d 491 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2009, pet. denied).
158. Id. at 500.
159. 272 S.W.3d 63, 66 (Tex. App.-Waco 2008, no pet.).
160. Id. at 68.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 71.
163. 274 S.W.3d 791 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2008, pet. denied).
164. Id. at 799.
165. Id. at 801.
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because of the state's sovereign immunity.166 Thus the landowner could
not bring a suit for breach of covenant or to compel the state to maintain
unfettered access.167 "Sovereign immunity [did] not shield the State from
an action for compensation under the takings clause."1 68 Also of interest,
the court of appeals held that diminished or impaired access was not com-
pensable, while an encroachment due to some drainage improvements
was. 169
C. EASEMENTS
In Allen v. Allen, the Amarillo Court of Appeals provided a good gen-
eral discussion of easements.170 This case, like Wood v. Walker,171 em-
phasizes the need to provide an identifying legal description.172 In this
case, the plaintiffs were unable to demonstrate that the road in dispute
was the same as a road established as a public road. This case also in-
cluded a theme common throughout this Survey period regarding inade-
quate "conclusory" affidavits.173 Here, an expert's affidavit identifying
the road as the same established in prior Commissioner's Court proceed-
ings did not explain how the expert was able to compare the road descrip-
tion from the court proceedings with a current map. As repeated
throughout the cases from this Survey period, "an expert's simple ipse
dixitl7 4 is insufficient to establish a matter; rather, the expert must explain
the basis of his statements to link his conclusions to the facts."1 75 In addi-
tion, the court of appeals restated the proposition that a prescriptive
easement cannot exist where a roadway is being used by permission or
jointly with others.176 Finally, using a common theory of recovery from
recent Survey periods, the court of appeals held that easement by estop-
pel was not established by acquiescence or statements such as "your way"
or "your road."' 77 Estoppel requires a positive representation upon
which the defendant relies to his detriment. 78
South Plains Lamesa Railroad, Ltd. v. Heinrich, also addressed an ease-
166. Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Allodial Ltd. P'ship, 280 S.W.3d 922, 924-25 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 2009, no pet.).
167. Id. at 925.
168. Id. at 926.
169. Id.
170. 280 S.W.3d 366, 366 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2008, pet. denied).
171. 279 S.W.3d 705, 713 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2007, no pet.).
172. Allen, 280 S.W.3d at 370.
173. But see Gillenwater v. Fort Brown Villas III, Condo. Assocs., Inc., 286 S.W.3d 35
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2007), rev'd on other grounds, 285 S.W.3d 879 (Tex. 2009)
(detailed analysis of a collapsing chaise lounge chair).
174. Clearly this year's term of choice was ipse dixit-"He himself said it; a bare asser-
tion resting on the authority of an individual." BLACK'S LAw DicIONARY 828 (6th ed.
1990). See also City of San Antonio v. Pollock, 284 S.W.3d 809 (Tex. 2009) ("a claim will
not stand or fall on the mere ipse dixit of a credentialed witness").
175. Allen, 280 S.W.3d at 376 (quoting Earle v. Ratliff, 998 S.W.2d 882, 890 (Tex.
1999)).
176. Id. at 377-78.




ment by estoppel.-79 In this case, the railroad told a landowner many
years ago that he could run two different water lines underneath the rail-
way, which the landowner did. Because of an unrelated conflict, the rail-
road later sought to terminate the landowner's right to run the water
lines. There was no written easement regarding the water lines, but the
railroad representative had indicated that one was not necessary. The
Amarillo Court of Appeals held that there was an easement by estoppel
based upon the railroad's representations and the landowner's reliance
on them. 80
Scown v. City of Alpine provides another drafting lesson in the ease-
ment context.181 In this case, the City constructed and maintained a
water pipeline on an owner's property with the proviso that the owner
would be provided water service. The agreement contained a reversion-
ary clause granting the City the option to abandon the easement with no
further obligations. The landowner sought to develop some of the prop-
erty and expand the use of the water connections, and the City chose to
terminate its easement because it believed it could not supply the neces-
sary services. Not surprisingly, a lawsuit ensued. The City contended
that its agreement with the landowner was terminable at will. The El
Paso Court of Appeals held that the agreement expressly permitted the
City to abandon the easement, and therefore the easement was essen-
tially temporary and terminable at will.1 8 2
Finally, in Shin-Con Development Corp. v. I.P. Investments, Ltd., the
Dallas Court of Appeals addressed the meaning of the word "if" in con-
nection with an alleged agreement to provide cross easements or mutual
easements.' 83 The drafted language in the agreement between the parties
stated,
"If [appellants fail] to obtain title to the property described in the
License Agreement, and execute a permanent easement agree-
ment . .. by January 31, 2003, [appellants] shall forfeit and pay all of
the money received from [appellee]."1 84
The court of appeals stated that the use of the term "if" was a condition
precedent and not just "a covenant or a promise." 185 Accordingly, the
failure to obtain the title contemplated by the agreement to support the
easements triggered a return of the monies initially paid in connection
with the agreement.186
179. 280 S.W.3d 357 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2008, no pet.).
180. Id. at 362.
181. 271 S.W.3d 380 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2008, no pet.).
182. Id. at 385-87.
183. 270 S.W.3d 759, 763, 767-68 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, pet. denied).
184. Id. at 766.
185. Id. at 766-67.
186. Id. at 768-69.
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D. RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS, CONDOMINIUMS, AND OWNERS'
ASSOCIATIONS
In yet another example of the insufficiencies of a conclusory affidavit,
the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a condominium declaration did not
create a contract between upstairs and downstairs owners.187 In Schin-
dler, the upstairs condominium unit suffered water leakage from a water
filtration unit that flooded the condominium unit below. The downstairs-
unit owner sued the upstairs-unit owner for breach of contract and negli-
gence. The court of appeals noted that a condominium declaration did
not create a contract between the owners.' 88 The court of appeals also
stated that the negligence claim was unfounded because the supporting
affidavit was conclusory-that is, it lacked underlying facts to support the
bold conclusions.189
However, in Stanford Development Corporation v. Stanford Condomin-
ium Owners Association, the Houston First Court of Appeals pointed out
that there could be a contract between the owners' association and a
property owner. 190 In this case, an initial sales contract between a pur-
chaser and a developer included an arbitration provision. The arbitration
provision created rights independent of the deed (which did not include
an arbitration provision) and was binding upon subsequent assignees and
owners of the property. 191 "The merger doctrine [did] not apply to a
deed that constitute[d] only partial performance of the preceding con-
tract." 192 Thus, the "contract for the sale of land . . . create[d] rights
collateral to and independent of the conveyance."1 9 3 The court of ap-
peals noted that the association was entitled to bring, and the purchasers
contractually consented to, an action on behalf of the membership to en-
force arbitration provisions.194 The case is possibly limited because of the
accompanying allegations of negligent design and construction, but the
court's opinion does not so indicate.
In another case, Gillebeard v. Bayview Acres Association, Inc., land-
owners sought to create a property owners' association to include a sin-
gle-family use restriction and to prevent construction of a condominium
project.195 The subdivision already included deed restrictions, but they
did not limit the property to single-family use. Chapter 201 of the Texas
Property Code provides a procedure to modify deed restrictions,196 but it
also provides a procedure for a property owner to opt out.197 Chapter
204 permits the creation of a property owners' association which, once
187. Schindler v. Baumann, 272 S.W.3d 793, 795-96 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.).
188. Id. at 795.
189. Id. at 796.
190. 285 S.W.3d 45, 46-48 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.).
191. Id. at 50-51.
192. Id. at 51.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. 263 S.W.3d 342, 342 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied).
196. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 201.004 (Vernon 2010).
197. See id. § 201.010.
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created, could then circulate a new petition to extend, add to, or modify
deed restrictions.1 98 Thus, the only purpose of the original petition circu-
lated by the owners was to create and operate a property owners' associa-
tion.199 Forming an association and modifying deed restrictions could not
be accomplished in a single petition.200 In essence, property owners
could create an association, but only the property owners' association
could take the steps to amend the restrictions.201 Accordingly, efforts by
the neighbors to simultaneously create a property owners' association
and to amend deed restrictions were ineffective. 202
As demonstrated in Meehl v. Wisel, the use of restrictive covenants to
limit the use of property as a single-family home also failed in the face of
the Community Homes Act. 2 0 3 Under this Act, regardless of the provi-
sions of the restrictive covenants, a group home was permissible if it met
the Act's other requirements. 204
Finally, in a more mundane factual pattern, the Austin Court of Ap-
peals determined the meaning of a 1978 deed restriction against "mobile
home . . . or temporary houses or residences" as the restriction might
apply to a modern modular home.205 In this case, the court of appeals
noted that "[clovenants restricting the free use of land [were] not fa-
vored" and would be construed "strictly against the party seeking to en-
force the restriction." 2 0 6 Thus, while the Property Code would provide
for a broad interpretation of restrictive covenants, 207 the court's opinion
would tend to strictly construe the language of the restrictive cove-
nants. 208 After noting that the modular homes were completed on site,
attached to a permanent concrete foundation, and included completion of
a roof and installation of dormers, the court of appeals remanded the
dispute to the trial court as a question of fact. 209
E. HOMESTEAD
Only a few cases decided during the Survey period warrant discussion
in the context of homesteads. In Denmon v. Atlas Leasing, LLC, the
Dallas Court of Appeals provided a good discussion of the principles and
factual nature of a homestead.210 In Denmon, the court of appeals noted
that a married person, not having any title interest in the property, can
198. See id. §§ 204.005(a), 204.006(a).
199. Gillebeard, 263 S.W.3d at 349-50.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 350.
203. 285 S.W.3d 561, 572 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.).
204. Id. at 568-69.
205. Jennings v. Bindseil, 258 S.W.3d 190, 193 (Tex. App.-Austin 2008, no pet.).
206. Id. at 194-95.
207. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 202.003(a) (Vernon 2007).
208. Jennings, 258 S.W.3d at 195.
209. Id. at 200-01.
210. 285 S.W.3d 591, 593 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2009, no pet.).
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establish and hold a homestead interest. 211 In this case, the husband lived
separately from the wife and visited her only rarely. Community prop-
erty was used to acquire the wife's home, and she took title solely in her
name. For purposes of discussion, the court of appeals indicated that
even if the property were separate property, it was still the joint home-
stead of the couple, and it noted that a community can have only a single
homestead. 212 The court of appeals probably overextended its statements
by indicating that the family-homestead claim was not maintainable by a
man and a woman living together in an unmarried state,213 as rural home-
stead law might dictate otherwise. But the holding of the court of appeals
was still correct: The lack of the husband's signature on the mechanic's
lien contract rendered the lien invalid. 214 Of interest, though not applica-
ble in this case, the court of appeals also noted that the homestead pro-
tection could be lost if owners "deliberately misrepresent[ed] their
marital status in order 'to defeat the rights of an innocent third party
who, in good faith, without notice, for valuable consideration, has ac-
quired valid liens."'215
In another matter, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District
of Texas engaged in a tortured analysis to try to find that a debtor was
estopped to claim a homestead.216 The court analyzed equitable estoppel
claims in considering whether representations in a deed of trust rendered
certain property not a homestead. The premises (a restaurant) were pri-
marily commercial, (restaurant), and the use of the property as a home-
stead was not apparent. The court considered this to be an ambiguous
possession and estopped the plaintiffs from claiming otherwise.217 A
closer review of Texas law would demonstrate that equitable estoppel will
apply only when there is more than one property that might serve as a
homestead. Use of the equitable estoppel theory to cause a claimant to
essentially waive her homestead is not consistent with Texas law.2 18
In Grant v. Clauser,219 the Houston Fourteenth Court of Appeals noted
an important concept in connection with the superiority of homestead
rights. 220 In this case, the property was the homestead of one cotenant
but not the other cotenant owner. A judgment creditor obtained the co-
tenant's non-homestead interest and sought to bring an action for parti-
tion. Of course, the property could not be partitioned in kind and was
required to be sold to accomplish partition. The court of appeals stated
211. Id. at 595.
212. See id. at 596.
213. See id.
214. Id. at 594-95.
215. Id. at 595 (citing Cadle Co. v. Ortiz, 227 S.W.2d 831, 835 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 2007, pet. denied)).
216. See In re Villarreal, 401 B.R. 823, 833-39 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009).
217. Id. at 836.
218. See also In re Harydzak, in which the appraisal obtained by the lender, demon-
strating possession of the property, defeated a bona fide lender status. Id. at 512, 517.
219. 287 S.W.3d 914 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.).
220. Id. at 919-21.
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that the one cotenant's homestead rights were subordinate to the other
cotenant's right of partition.221
Finally, for those defending home equity loans or violations of the
Texas constitution, the Dallas Court of Appeals found in one case that
limitations began on an eighty-percent loan to fair market value cap at
the time of closing.222 The court of appeals noted that the legal injury
accrued at the time of closing, and thus an action to invalidate the home
equity loan must have been brought within four years of the date of
closing.223
F. TITLE INSURANCE
In GCI GP, LLC v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co.,224 the Houston First
Court of Appeals held that "removables" were covered by the terms of a
lender's title insurance policy. 2 2 5 The lender contended that the title pol-
icy provided coverage for the removable claims because the policy in-
sured the priority of the lien of the insured mortgage over any other liens.
Stewart Title had denied coverage because the removables were "per-
sonal property," not part of the "land" defined in the policy. The lender
contended that "removables" are not personal property once they are
affixed to the land; instead, they are part of the real property and there-
fore are covered by the terms of the policy. In particular, the title policy
provided coverage against: "5. The priority of any lien or encumbrance
over the lien of the insured mortgage; 6. Lack of priority of the lien of
the insured mortgage over any statutory or constitutional mechanic's,
contractor's, or materialmen's lien for labor or material having its incep-
tion on or before Date of Policy." 226
The court of appeals broke the question down to whether the lien claim
has priority over the lien of the insured mortgage.227 If the lien claim has
priority, then the policy clearly provided, in paragraph 5, "indemnity for
any losses or damages arising therefrom." 228 Further, paragraph 6 makes
it clear that the policy provides coverage against mechanic's liens. Thus,
Texas Property Code section 53.123 provides priority for mechanic's liens
over other liens when those liens support a "removable," even though the
inception date occurs after the recording date of a deed of trust lien. 2 2 9
The court of appeals also noted that Schedule B, providing exceptions
from coverage, had "no exception . . . for mechanic's liens involving re-
movable improvements." 2 3 0 The reasoning in this case is somewhat diffi-
221. Id. at 921.
222. Rivera v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 262 S.W.3d 834, 840 (Tex. App.-Dallas
2008, no pet.).
223. Id.
224. 290 S.W.3d 287 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.).
225. Id. at 291.
226. Id. at 293.
227. Id. at 294.
228. Id.
229. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.123(a) (Vernon 2007); GCI GP, 290 S.W.3d at 295.
230. GCI GP, 290 S.W.3d at 296 n.9.
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cult, although ultimately, the title company suffered from poor policy
language. 231 A title company would never be able to protect itself against
a lien for removables when that lien arose post-policy, because it could
not examine the records for such. However, clearly the lien supporting a
removable does take priority over a mortgage lien even though it is prior
in time. As a result, more and more practitioners will see title policies
with exceptions for mechanic's liens involving removables located in their
Schedule B.
G. Lis PENDENS
Controversies over lis pendens and constructive trust claims often
come hand in hand, and this Survey period was no different. In Long
Beach Mortgage Co. v. Evans,232 the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a
receiver's pleadings in a California proceeding could support a Texas lis
pendens. 233 In this case, a receiver was appointed in a suit brought by the
SEC against a California entity for federal securities laws violations. The
receiver filed his "order of appointment and the complaint from the SEC
litigation in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Texas." 234 He additionally filed a "notice of lis pendens" in Dallas
County, Texas. In the federal court action in California, the receiver
sought the imposition of a constructive trust on property purchased with
the improperly gained funds.235 A judgment was obtained imposing the
constructive trust, and eventually the federal court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Texas divested some of the defendants of all title and interest to
property in Dallas County, vesting full fee simple title to the property in
the receiver. The defendants had also obtained a home equity loan from
Long Beach, filing the home equity deed of trust lien in early August,
apparently unaware of the notice of lis pendens filed only a week earlier.
The defendants defaulted on the home equity loan, thereby creating a
lien priority conflict between Long Beach and the receiver. The notice of
lis pendens specifically identified the Dallas County property, but the un-
derlying litigation did not. The court of appeals held that there was no
"case authority requiring [a] pleading to specifically identify the property
listed in [a] lis pendens" and that the identification in the lis pendens was
adequate to create notice. 236 Moreover, the court of appeals held that
seeking a constructive trust to obtain an interest in the real property
would support a lis pendens, an issue that is often discussed in Texas case
law.2 3 7 Long Beach also argued that a lis pendens must be indexed in
231. For instance, the court of appeals never addresses the fact that the lien claim for
the removables arose after the date of the policy, not on or before, as stated in paragraph
6. Rather, it used the recognition of a mechanic's lien claim under paragraph 6 to find
coverage under paragraph 5. Id. at 294-95.
232. 284 S.W.3d 406 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2009, pet. denied).
233. Id. at 412-13.
234. Id. at 409.
235. See id.
236. Id. at 412-13.
237. Id. at 414.
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order to be effective notice, but the court of appeals again noted that
there was no provision in Texas Property Code § 13.004 which required
indexing to create notice. 238 As the reader may be aware, indexing is
required in connection with an abstract of judgment lien. This may well
be an issue to be visited by the Texas legislature. 239
Somewhat in conflict with Long Beach, the Tyler Court of Appeals
held venue mandatory where property was located for a constructive
trust to be imposed against the property.240 Of course, In re Lemons did
not deal with a federal court situation as in Long Beach.
Finally, in Moneyhon v. Moneyhon,241 pleadings seeking a constructive
trust were held to be inadequate for failure to include an allegation of a
fiduciary duty as between a mother and son.2 4 2 This case may well re-
mind one of the title risks posed by familial relationships and the changes
which may affect that relationship. Initially, the son lived with his mother
in a home where he also cared for her due to her failing health. When
the son later married, the mother sold the home and used the proceeds to
purchase a home in Lake Jackson. Title to the Lake Jackson home was
transferred to the son alone. Once the son's new wife moved into the
Lake Jackson home, the couple's relationship with the mother deterio-
rated. Eventually, the couple served the seventy-five-year-old mother
with a notice of eviction, hoping she would move to an assisted-living
facility. Instead, the mother filed suit to determine ownership of the
home and declare a constructive trust. The Houston Fourteenth Court of
Appeals held that no constructive trust was supported by the
pleadidgs.243
On the other hand, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Texas (Tyler Division) held in one case that an equitable lien
could be established against a condominium held by an innocent home-
owner/girlfriend, when the condo was paid off with funds from a ponzi
scheme.244 Arguably, because the girlfriend lacked any real equity in the
condominium, and because she had used improperly gained funds to pay
off a mortgage, the court allowed the receiver to step into the shoes of the
previous mortgagee.245
238. Id. at 415 (referencing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 13.004 (Vernon 2004)).
239. Note also Texas Property Code section 12.007(d), effective September 1, 2009,
which now requires service of the notice on parties to a lawsuit. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.
§ 12.007(d) (Vernon 2010). This might have resulted in a different outcome.
240. In re Lemons, 281 S.W.3d 643, 648 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2009, no pet.).
241. 278 S.W.3d 874 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.).
242. Id. at 876, 878.
243. Id. at 878.
244. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Hudgins, 620 F. Supp. 2d 790, 794-95
(E.D. Tex. 2009).





In Rankin v. FPL Energy, LLC,2 4 6 the single case of interest in the
area of nuisance, the Eastland Court of Appeals addressed the new wind
farm phenomenon. 247 In this case the neighbors brought a nuisance ac-
tion against the wind farm operators, primarily based upon aesthetics and
noise. The court of appeals recognized that nuisance could be based
upon an invasion of property by light, sound, odor, or foreign substance,
but it declined to hold that a nuisance could be based upon aesthetical
complaints. 248 The court of appeals was apologetic to the plaintiffs, tak-
ing care not to "minimize the impact of FPL's wind farm by characteriz-
ing" the plaintiffs as "emotional." 2 4 9 "Unobstructed sunsets, panoramic
landscapes, and starlit skies have inspired countless artists and authors
and have brought great pleasure to those fortunate enough to live in
scenic rural settings." 250 Still, aesthetic impact cannot constitute a sub-
stantive interference with the use and enjoyment of land.251 The plain-
tiffs were unsuccessful in this case in large part due to inadequate expert
testimony,252 but the case provided an interesting jury instruction:
In determining whether the Defendant(s) have substantially inter-
fered with the Plaintiffs' use and enjoyment of their property, you
may not consider whether the Plaintiffs are offended, disturbed, or
annoyed because of the way the wind turbine project has affected
their landscape, scenery, or the beauty of the area. Under the laws
of the State of Texas, a condition that causes aesthetic changes to the
view, scenery, landscape, or beauty of an area is not a nuisance. The
Plaintiffs' feelings and beliefs about the turbines' impact on the aes-
thetic character of the area, including any impact on the beauty,
scenery, landscape, view, or appearance of the area may not be con-
sidered a substantial interference with the use and enjoyment of the
Plaintiffs' property. Therefore, any emotional or physical damage to
Plaintiffs or any diminished market value caused by aesthetic or
sight-based objections to the condition, if they exist, cannot be a ba-
sis for economic or non-economic damage. 253
B. PREMISES LIABILITY
In TXI Operations, LP v. Perry,254 the Texas Supreme Court under-
took an extensive discussion of the duty of an owner to warn an invitee of
246. 266 S.W.3d 506 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2008, pet. denied).
247. Id. at 510.
248. Id. at 509, 513.
249. Id. at 512.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. See id. at 514.
253. Id. at 508 n.3.
254. 278 S.W.3d 763 (Tex. 2009).
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a dangerous situation.255 In this case, a truck-driver invitee was injured
when his truck hit a pothole on the property, which the owner of the
property knew was there. The owner had posted fifteen-mile-an-hour
speed signs and contended that the posting of the speed limit discharged
his duty to warn, as a matter of law. The supreme court disagreed, indi-
cating that whether an adequate warning had been provided was a ques-
tion of fact.2 5 6 Justice Hecht, joined by Justices Medina and Willitt,
dissented, noting that the pothole was obvious and cautioning against the
possibility that the majority's opinion would lead to the ridiculous re-
quirement that even obvious potholes be marked. 257
In Mayer v. Willowbrook Plaza Limited Partnership,258 the Houston
Fourteenth Court of Appeals noted that employees, as invitees, could
lose that status when acting outside the scope of the invitation. 259 In this
case, employees returned to a parking lot between 4:00 and 5:00 in the
morning to retrieve vehicles they had left there. They were injured by the
criminal conduct of third parties. The court of appeals held that the em-
ployees were not invitees at the time of the injury; thus the employer had
no duty to protect them from criminal activity. 260 In Hernandez v.
Brinker International, Inc.,261 the Houston Fourteenth Court of Appeals
also held that Chapter 95 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code
did not preclude a premises-liability claim by an employee of a contractor
for a defect in a separate improvement. 262 In this case, the injured indi-
vidual was an employee of the air conditioning contractor, and the defect
was in the roof, separate from the air conditioning system. The court of
appeals held that Chapter 95 was limited to the actual improvement that
the contractor was working on and not a separate "improvement" such as
the roof.2 6 3 This is a fairly narrow and strained reading of Chapter 95,
which was pointed out in the dissent by Justice Yates.264
C. BROKERS
The cases decided during this Survey period reemphasize the necessity
of having a written agreement in order to collect a real estate commis-
sion. In Duncan v. F-Star Management, LLC, 2 6 5 the El Paso Court of
Appeals noted the need for a specific written agreement which addition-
ally identified the property with reasonable certainty.266 In this case, the
court of appeals held that a letter agreement with only a general identifi-
255. Id. at 764-65.
256. Id. at 765.
257. Id. at 773 (Hecht, Medra, & Willitt, JJ., dissenting).
258. 278 S.W.3d 901 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.).
259. Id. at 909-10.
260. Id. at 913.
261. 285 S.W.3d 152 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.).
262. Id. at 161-62 (citing TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 95.003).
263. Id. at 157-58 (citing TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 95.002(2)).
264. Id. at 164 (Yates, J., dissenting).
265. 281 S.W.3d 474 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2008, pet. denied) (plurality opinion).
266. Id. at 478.
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cation of a real estate project was insufficient. 267 Also, in Sellers v.
Gomez,268 alternative theories of recovery for a real estate commission
could not circumvent the requirement that a commission agreement be in
writing and signed by the party to be charged.269 The El Paso Court of
Appeals in this case was incensed enough by the history of the communi-
cations between the parties to assess sanctions against the plaintiff's
counsel. 270 The case involved an interesting history of unsolicited offers
to purchase the property which had not been accepted. Finally, ERA Re-
alty Group, Inc. v. Advocates for Children and Families, Inc. 2 71 reempha-
sized the need to be very specific in connection with written commission
agreements. 272 In this case, a preprinted form provided for commission,
but the box dealing with commissions payable in the event of a lease was
not checked. This was unenforceable in spite of the fact that six had been
typed into a final blank space but the box not checked. 273
D. ENTITIES
In Seidler v. Morgan,274 the Texarkana Court of Appeals provides a
good discussion of joint enterprise and alter ego in connection with per-
sonal injuries sustained while riding a horse on a dude ranch. 275 In this
case, the plaintiffs sued the wrong "Fish Creek Ranch" and apparently
sought to use joint enterprise and alter ego to find a proper and possibly
solvent defendant. The court of appeals first discussed suits in an as-
sumed name, but stated that a place name was not an adequate basis for
which to impose liability. 276 Rather the owner/operator needs to be
properly identified as the defendant. The court of appeals engaged in an
interesting discussion relating to continuation of a name of a business
when only the assets have been sold, and the lack of liability if the sale
was an arms-length transaction.277 Also, a joint enterprise did not exist,
because there was no written agreement between the parties and no evi-
dence of such an agreement. Moreover, there was no common purpose
between entities, with financial benefit not being adequate. Simply, alter
ego did not lie because personal use for benefit claims were insufficient to
apply an alter-ego theory.278 The court of appeals delved into modern
popular language and yielded to temptation, stating: "A major purpose of
a corporation, a limited liability company, or a limited partnership is to
provide a shield to personal liability. Although this legal shield may be
267. Id.
268. 281 S.W.3d 108 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2008, pet. denied).
269. Id. at 115.
270. Id. at 116.
271. 267 S.W.3d 114 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2008, pet. denied).
272. Id. at 119.
273. Id. at 118-19.
274. 277 S.W.3d 549 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2009, pet. denied).
275. Id. at 556-57.
276. Id. at 553-54.
277. Id. at 554.
278. Id. at 556-57.
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inconvenient to her theory of recovery, to Seidler it is an inconvenient
truth which may not be ignored." 279
E. WATER RIGHTS
Most of the cases that were decided during the Survey period that deal
with water revolve around the permit and application processes. In Ed-
wards Aquifer Authority v. Day,280 the San Antonio Court of Appeals
explored the difference between ground water and surface water and the
regulatory authority for each. 281 In this case, the applicants were owners
of ranch property within the Edwards Aquifer and made application for
an initial regular permit (IRP) from the Edwards Aquifer Authority. Pre-
viously, the applicants used an artesian well which flowed through a ditch
to a lake built on the property. The lake also gathered surface water and
rainfall. Water from the lake had been used over time as part of a sprin-
kler irrigation system for coastal Bermuda. On occasion, for a much
smaller portion of the property, the ditch was dammed and some of the
land flooded to provide irrigation. The Edwards Aquifer Act triggered
on June 1, 1993, and created a permit system that gave preference to ex-
isting users but which required some evidence and proof of the prior us-
age.2 8 2 The applicants had not previously utilized a pump with the
artesian well and had no meter but rather "an uncontrolled, continuous
artesian flow." 2 8 3 The applicants endured a painful administrative pro-
cess, which included making application to the Edwards Aquifer Author-
ity, a hearing before the State Office of Administrative Hearings
(SOAH), and then trial in a district court. In the end, the failure to have
records, the failure to raise some points for appeal at the trial level, and
the unknowing capture and use of water from a lake as opposed to just
straight from the well, did the applicants in.284
Initially, the applicant sought permission to pump 700 acre-feet of
water to irrigate crops. The Edwards Aquifer Authority initially indi-
cated that it might permit 600-acre feet but ultimately recommended that
the IRP be denied. The matter was referred to SOAH, which noted the
fifty-acre reservoir or lake and the fact that it was fed not only by the
ditch but from a creek and from watershed when it rained.285 SOAH also
found that the creek and the lake were water courses, which meant the
water within those water courses was state surface water.286 Accordingly,
the water being used for irrigation was state surface water and subject to
regulation by the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality
279. Id. at 556.
280. 274 S.W.3d 742 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2008, pet. granted).
281. Id. at 752.
282. Id. at 747-48 (citing Edwards Aquifer Act of May 30, 1993, 73rd Leg., R.S., ch. 626,
§ 103, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 2350, 2351).
283. Id. at 748.
284. Id. at 753-54, 759-60.
285. Id. at 749.
286. Id. at 750.
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(TCEQ).287 The water taken from the lake for irrigation could not be
used as the basis for a permit authorizing the use of water to be with-
drawn from the Edwards Aquifer. Because of the flooding previously
noted, a minimum of fourteen acre-feet of water was recommended as a
basis for an IRP. The court of appeals stated that the ground water, once
entering the lake, became surface water and property of the state.288 The
Edwards Aquifer Authority had no authority to regulate the state
water.289
Also, water course was defined as having "(1) a defined bed and banks,
(2) a current of water, and (3) a permanent source of supply."290 The bed
and banks could be slight and imperceptible, and the water-bearing chan-
nel could even be dry for periods of time.291 In this case, the lake was
clearly a watercourse, and once water from the well entered the lake, its
character changed. The court of appeals did suggest that, had the owners
been able to measure both the amount of water put into the watercourse
by the artesian well and the amount taken out, it might have had a basis
for applying any exception for the transportation of ground water. 292
Of course, with a law to be passed in the future in 1993, the owners had
not known previously to keep these kinds of records; however, the point
of error that the law was a retroactive law in violation of the Texas consti-
tution was raised too late on appeal.293 Additionally, this was not a tak-
ing by the state, because the Water Code did not give the state ownership
of the real property beneath the water course but only controlled the
water. 294 The constitution makes it clear that the state has a right to use
water courses to meet its constitutionally mandated duty to conserve and
develop the state's water resources. 295 In a case that seems like form
over substance, the applicants came up short for not knowing the future.
However, statutes based upon historical or existing use are fairly typical
and require proof of that historical use.2 9 6
XI. CONCLUSION
There were no significant legal developments during this Survey period
affecting real property law; however, a number of cases are instructive
and beneficial to the practitioner. In summary, the following are the legal
developments and practical advice from this year's Survey period cases:
287. Id.
288. Id. at 752.
289. See id. at 755.
290. Id. at 752 (citing Hoefs v. Short, 273 S.W. 785, 786-87 (Tex. 1925)).
291. Id. (quoting Hoefs, 273 S.W. at 787).
292. Id. at 753.
293. Id. at 759-60.
294. Id. at 759 (internal citations omitted).
295. Id. at 757 (citing TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 59(a)).
296. See Guitar Holding Co., L.P. v. Hudspeth County Underground Water Conserva-
tion Dist. No. 1, 263 S.W.3d 910 (Tex. 2008) (distinguishing water utilized on a historical
basis from water to be transferred outside the management district).
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1. Deed-in-lieu-of-foreclosure transactions continue to be prevalent
and supported by the courts.
2. The requirement for an affidavit supporting the transfer of a tax
lien has been refined in Kothmann.297 But practitioners should be wary,
because the authors believe that the result in Kothmann may be
overturned.
3. There is greater clarity as to the proof necessary for a lost or mis-
placed note and deed of trust in connection with the transfer of those
documents.
4. Practical lessons for drafting of "bad boy" carve-out provisions, the
definition of "mortgaged property" and covenants on hotel franchise
agreements have been highlighted.
5. Unfortunately, the law on the spreading doctrine and savings
clause was misanalyzed in Kennon;298 do not be misled.
6. The Texas Supreme Court clarified that there is no presumption
that places a burden on the seller to prove the purchaser's knowing and
voluntary agreement to a jury waiver.
7. Numerous opinions provide clear direction that in contests over
real estate, conclusory affidavits by experts or others will not be
acceptable.
8. Two common themes found recently are that real estate brokers
must have written agreements to support a claim for commission and can-
not seek recovery through other causes of action, and courts of appeal
still vary as to whether constructive-trust and equitable-lien claims will
support a lis pendens.
9. Finally, the Ramsey case will be often cited because it reaffirms an
earlier case, Tarrant Bank v. Miller, which suggests that a creditor must
provide a partial release of judgment lien in connection with the sale of a
homestead by the debtor.299
297. See Kothmann v. Genesis Tax Loan Servs., 288 S.W.3d 503, 513 (Tex. App.-
Amarillo 2009, pet. filed).
298. See Kennon v. McGraw, 281 S.W.3d 648, 650-52 (Tex: App.-Eastland 2009, no
pet.).
299. See Ramsey v. Davis, 261 S.W.3d 811, 817 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, pet. denied);
Tarrant Bank v. Miller, 833 S.W.2d 666, 667 (Tex. App.-Eastand 1992, writ denied).
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